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Is the EU altruistic or deeply self-interested?

This essay aims to assess the nature of the EU in terms of foreign aid and development. The EU has always been intended to be an economic trade bloc, however through years of expansion and growth it has gained much more political and practical power. Now, the EU is a major provider of aid and assistance to states outside its borders. Whereas it is argued that foreign aid and interference began as an altruistic practice intended to help states in need, it has certainly changed. Easily observable differences can be seen when investigating EU practices throughout the past few decades. Negotiations have become increasingly self-interested, and aid often comes with clauses attached such as trade agreements. While observing the history of this gradual change, the aim of this essay it to pinpoint when this change began to occur and at what time the EU would be classed as more self-interested than altruistic. 

To understand the question of how altruistic the EU is and how their approach to foreign aid and development has changed, it is imperative to investigate the initial EU method and the beginning of their journey to becoming the largest provider of aid worldwide. It is also important to note that “there is no single ‘European foreign policy’ … and all states still conduct their own foreign policies” (Smith, 2004). Before implementing institutions into the EU system such as CFSP/CSDP which “was first established in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty” (EUR-Lex, no date), international aid was conducted through individual member states far more than through EU bodies. There was much less of a coordinated and common direction before 1993, and even 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty became effective. Before 1993, the EU was not active enough in foreign development and aid enough to make a judgement on its altruism in this regard. Therefore the time period after 1993 will be the focus in this essay.

The decade following 1993 saw a remarkable upturn in EU foreign aid. The years “between November 1993 and May 1995, eight joint actions were pursued”. Examples of the aid that was provided, which can be observed to calculate the EU’s level of altruism in this era include “supporting measures to enhance stability and peace in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) and the Middle East [and] providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia” (Bindi, 2016). It can be said that Bosnia in the 1990s is where the EU first implemented many of its international aid and development strategies. A.E. Juncos (2005) describes how Bosnia became the “test ground” for the EU to build itself “a new identity as a regional normative power”. Juncos also explains that prior to Bosnia, the EU’s inability to act in a military sense, diminished its power and “showed the limitations” of “CFSP”. Even though the CFSP was limited at this time, the EU was seen to promote altruistic values in the most effective way it could. As found in Juncos’ article, “economic assistance … was provided on condition that recipients respect human rights”. This was a key moment that proved the EU’s dedication to civil liberty rather than purely economical gain. While the EU’s involvement in Bosnia is often regarded to as unsuccessful, it demonstrated the willingness to pursue altruistic and non-selfish goals outside of its borders. This is also important as the EU could have easily ignored the human rights violations instead of providing aid. 

Another aspect of the EU that promotes altruism can be found in the Treaty of Amsterdam, implemented in 1997. The larger and more economically advanced states in the EU have always had more power and influence within the various institutions. This meant that interests of the big states were pursued, leaving the wishes of the smaller EU states disrespected. The “solution adopted” in the Treaty of Amsterdam “was that of ‘constructive abstention’” within CFSP. Furthermore, when making declarations if “one third of weighted votes” are abstentions “the decision may not be adopted” (Kortenberg, 1998). This encouraged further cooperation between states, letting all voices be heard. These actions proved altruism from the larger states, with their desire to give up power in return for fairer and more balanced approaches to international aid.

The relatively unsuccessful attempt of promoting peace in Bosnia saw a rise of a new form of EU aid that focused on building its military power. This gave rise to further examples that can be examined for the context of investigating the EU’s potential altruistic nature. It can be said that when the EU began upgrading its military capabilities, it began to show its self-interested side. Local crises for example were addressed, whereas crises further from EU borders were ignored. Nováky (2014) summarised this by stating describing how “CSDP military operations” are “catalyzed by events. These events enter into the EU’s agenda because they create local humanitarian problems or produce, or threaten to produce, negative externalities for some or all EU member states”. This is evidence that for the EU to intervene, in the vast majority of cases, there has to be a direct threat or problem that effects the EU. If there are humanitarian crises across the world, this is not of immediate interest to the EU. Mattelaer, who used the example of the civil war in Chad which began in 2005, validates this point. “While the conflict in Chad may affect the interests of some European member states, there is no direct threat to the primary interests of any of these states, let alone of the EU”. Therefore, it is doubtful that “operations will be perused with great determination” (2013). It is clear from this evidence that the EU typically ignores the altruistic route of preventing humanitarian crises when it does not suit their own interests. 

The 21st century can be argued as the beginning of the EU focusing much harder on self-interests. This was accelerated by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty gave “the EU full legal personality” permitting it “the ability to sign international treaties” with member states only able to “sign international agreements that are compatible with EU law” (European Parliament, 2022). The treaty allowed the EU to obtain a significantly higher influence on the international stage. One reason for this is the EU’s increased bargaining power. This increased power, along with the fact that “the autonomy of the EU development policy sub-system” became “threatened by mounting ambitions from the EU trade and security realms”, meant that EU international aid became tainted with selfishness (Orbie, 2012). Conditionality is the term used to describe the way that institutions require ‘conditions’ for to receive aid. Richter and Wunsch (2019) describe “how EU conditionality has effectively contributed to the consolidation of such detrimental governance patterns” in the Balkans. They depict how conditionality has “sought to foster democratic reforms in the Western Balkans”. One of the first EU conditions was “pressure for the liberalisation of markets” which aimed to not only help the Western Balkans to benefit the EU by allowing these countries to be applicable for trade. However, “in the absence of a comprehensive legal framework allowed a small economic elite to realise private gains and build powerful networks that influence political decision-making”. This shows how security and economic aims of the EU interfere with development and aid. In many cases such as the Western Balkans case, it is said that the EU should apply more altruistic approaches. Perhaps altruism is at the forefront of the EU’s goals, yet its multi-faceted approach allows for its selfish aims to get in the way. 

The war in Ukraine has again brought to light the selfishness of the EU, disproving its altruism. Former EU Parliament member Andrew Duff (2022) explains that “while on the emotional level the bloc’s response to the application [of Ukraine to join the EU] has been warm … the European Council must set compassion aside”. He states that “Ukraine simply lacks the capacity to shoulder the burden of EU membership”. Duff shares the view of the EU that Ukraine is not developed enough or economically stable enough to join the EU. This is concerning as EU membership may have been able to assist Ukraine economically. It could be seen as an issue that states cannot join the EU until they advanced enough, especially since being part of the EU would extremely accelerate growth in these stats. Alone, this shows a self-interested approach. The EU is unwilling to take on a slight burden in order to massively improve the fortunes of a state. Even more concerning is the perception that if Ukraine was entered into the EU, the conflict with Russia would be greatly deterred. 

While the EU has imposed sanctions on Russia, it has continued to satisfy its own interests. Sanctions that the EU have imposed on Russia include, “prohibition on imports from Russia of iron, steel, wood, cement and plastics, prohibition on imports from Russia of coal [and] 1241 individuals and 118 entities are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban because their actions have undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence” (European Council, 2022). These sanctions definitely show that the EU is trying to deter Russia from conflict and clearly displays their good intentions. The problem arises when the entire situation is considered. According to Euronews (2022), by the time a little over a month had passed since the invasion, the EU spent “€35 billion [on Russian energy exports], compared to the €1 billion it gave to Ukraine “to arm itself”. It is true that moving to a new energy exporter is hard, but the difference between these figures speaks volumes. The EU consistently proves its preference to gain economically rather than focus on aid and development.

Overall, it is difficult to conclude how altruistic the EU is. In the past, especially in the twentieth century, the EU was seen to be altruistic in many ways. This could be due to its lesser power than its modern self. In this century the EU was less able to ‘swing its weight about’. It also focused on human rights as opposed to economic gain when intervening in international states. It was also a time where impressive innovations were made under treaties such as that of Maastricht and Amsterdam. These treaties gave smaller EU states more input into decision making and widened the amount of people being represented, proving altruism from large EU states. 

However, a shift was seen in the 21st century. Military expansion and economic growth saw the EU gain more power, leading to a more self-interested nature. Conditionality was adopted and aid appeared to have an ulterior motives behind it in many cases. This was seen in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, there was an easily observable willingness to ignore conflicts that had little impact on the EU. If crises do not affect the EU directly, humanitarian problems are likely to be disregarded such as the civil war in Chad. As shown throughout this essay, there was a change in the nature of the EU and the institution became far more self-interested.

Bibliography:

  • Juncos, A.E. (2005) The EU’s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina:(re) Integrating the Balkans and/or (re) Inventing the EU?. Southeast European Politics6(2)
  • Kortenberg, H. (1998) Closer cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam, Common Market Law Review35(4)
  • Mattelaer, A. (2013) The politico-military dynamics of European crisis response operations: Planning, friction, strategy. Springer.
  • Nováky, N.I. (2015) Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective. European security24(4)
  • Richter, S. and Wunsch, N. (2022) Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans, Journal of European Public Policy27(1)
  • Smith, K. (2004) The making of EU foreign policy: the case of Eastern Europe, Springer.

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